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Abstract – The STS-118 flight of the Space Shuttle Endeavour
was the first shuttle mission flown with three Global Positioning 
System (GPS) receivers in place of the three legacy Tactical Air
Navigation (TACAN) units.  This marked the conclusion of a 15 
year effort involving procurement, missionization, integration, 
and flight testing of a GPS receiver and a parallel effort to 
formulate and implement shuttle computer software changes to 
support GPS.    The use of GPS data from a single receiver in 
parallel with TACAN during entry was successfully 
demonstrated by the orbiters Discovery and Atlantis during four 
shuttle missions in 2006 and 2007.  This provided the confidence
needed before flying the first all GPS, no TACAN flight with 
Endeavour.  A significant number of lessons were learned 
concerning the integration of a software intensive navigation 
unit into a legacy avionics system.  These lessons have been 
taken into consideration during vehicle design by other flight 
programs, including the vehicle that will replace the Space 
Shuttle, Orion.  
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 21, 2007, the Space Shuttle Endeavour ended 
the STS-118 mission with a successful entry and landing 
using three GPS receivers in place of three legacy TACAN 
units.  Space Shuttle entry navigation performance has been 
excellent since the first shuttle mission in 1981.  However, in 
1993 the planned phase-out of TACAN in favor of GPS 
starting in the year 2000 motivated the Shuttle Program to 
select a GPS receiver for TACAN replacement.  The shuttle 
was originally scheduled to fly the first all GPS, no TACAN 
flight in mid 1999.  However, delays in the start of TACAN 
phase-out, a desire to conduct additional flight and ground 
testing before shuttle GPS certification, the continued 
excellent performance of the legacy entry navigation system, 
and the loss of the shuttle Columbia delayed the use of GPS 
during entry and landing. Had the TACAN phase-out start 
dates specified in successive editions of the Federal 
Radionavigation Plan not slipped, the Shuttle Program would 
have pursued a more aggressive GPS implementation 
schedule.
The Space Shuttle performs winged hypersonic entry and 
unpowered runway landings.  This was a significant change 
from the ballistic and low lift-to-drag ratio entries and 
parachute landings into the ocean performed during the 
Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo-Soyuz             
_
programs.  Consequently, the avionics and navigation 
architecture for the shuttle was more complex and had more 
redundancy than the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo 
spacecraft.  GPS was integrated into the flight proven shuttle 
avionics system in a manner that did not compromise the 
certification status or performance of the legacy system [1] 
[2].  While many avionics units from aviation were adapted 
for the shuttle in the 1970s, none were as complex in terms of 
software as a GPS receiver.  Many lessons were learned that 
are being applied to other flight programs, including the 
development of the new NASA human flight vehicle, Orion 
[3-7]. 
This paper contains an overview of entry navigation for the 
Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and shuttle vehicles, enabling the 
reader to understand how different mission requirements 
drove navigation system redundancy and capability.  The 
shuttle GPS integration architecture is discussed, along with 
the flight test program.  A summary of GPS performance on 
four GPS ramp-up flights, immediately preceding the first 
TACAN replacement flight, is given.  Finally, performance 
results from the STS-118 flight of Endeavour are discussed.
II. SUMMARY OF MERCURY, GEMINI, AND APOLLO
ENTRY NAVIGATION
A. Mercury
The primary objective of Project Mercury was to 
determine if a human could function in space.  The Mercury 
spacecraft did not have an on-board navigation system as 
found on later vehicles, nor did it have a digital computer.  
Mercury was equipped with sensors for attitude 
determination and maintenance. These sensors included a 
two degree-of-freedom directional gyro, a two degree-of-
freedom vertical gyro, a 0.05 g accelerometer switch, and 
infra-red horizon scanners that provided roll and pitch data 
for alignment of the attitude gyros.
Beyond the deorbit burn, Mercury did not have the ability 
to modify the orbit in a targeted fashion, although small solid 
propellant rockets were fired during separation from the 
Atlas booster.  Ground tracking and orbit determination was 
used to determine the time of ignition of the retro-rockets for 
deorbit. This time was transmitted to the vehicle. The de-
orbit burn essentially aimed the spacecraft for the desired     
_
Copyright © 2008 by United Space Alliance, LLC. Published by the IEEE and ION with permission.  These materials are sponsored by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration under Contract NNJ06VA01C. The U.S. Government retains a paid-up, nonexclusive, 
irrevocable worldwide license in such materials to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies to the public, and perform publicly and 
display publicly, by or on behalf of the U.S. Government. All other rights are reserved by the copyright owners.
2splashdown point.  Retro fire could be commanded 
automatically or manually by the astronaut.  The splashdown 
location was selected so that ground tracking could be 
performed after retro fire.  This data was used to ensure that 
recovery forces had accurate knowledge of where the capsule 
would land.
A ballistic entry profile minimized requirements for the 
autopilot, guidance, and control. The vehicle rolled during 
entry to cancel out any lift effects caused by center of mass 
dispersions. These dispersions could cause the vehicle to fly 
at a non-zero angle of attack and result in a small amount of 
lift, causing the vehicle to miss the targeted splashdown 
point.
The experience gained by mission operations, engineering, 
management, and software personnel during Project Mercury 
proved to be invaluable and was directly applied to the 
development of navigation techniques and tracking network 
architectures used in the Gemini and Apollo Programs.
B. Gemini
Programmatic objectives of the Gemini Program required a 
more complex and capable on-board navigation system than 
Mercury.  These objectives included manually piloted and 
automated lifting entry to reach a targeted splashdown point, 
and rendezvous and docking.  
A lifting capsule was achieved by intentionally offsetting 
the center of mass.  On-board avionics hardware used during 
entry included a digital flight computer, a four-gimbal stable 
member Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), and rate gyros for 
use in the event of an IMU failure during entry.  Before 
deorbit, the IMU was aligned to an inertial frame using two 
redundant Earth horizon sensors. The Gemini computer 
propagated a state vector during entry for use by the entry 
guidance algorithm.  In case of an IMU failure, backup rate 
gyro data and out-the-window monitoring of the Earth 
horizon were available to support manual piloting.  The 
manual procedure consisted of flying ground supplied 
constant bank angles, with bank angle reversals at ground 
specified times.  
Gemini had a ballistic entry mode similar to Mercury.   The 
vehicle was continuously rolled to cancel out the lift effect 
from the offset center of gravity.  Two lifting entry modes 
shaped the descent trajectory by modulating the lift vector to 
reduce and control predicted down-range and cross-range 
errors. The first mode maintained a constant bank angle to 
control the lift vector to reduce the predicted down-range 
error at the target point. Cross-range control was achieved by 
rolling the vehicle to reverse the sign of the constant bank 
angle value. This technique was similar in concept to that 
flown later by Apollo and the Space Shuttle. The second 
mode was called rolling entry.  It flew a lifting entry to place
the vehicle on a ballistic trajectory that would reach the target 
point. Once the vehicle achieved the conditions necessary for 
the ballistic trajectory, it was continuously rolled to cancel 
out the lift vector. 
Both of the lifting modes could be flown manually by the 
crew based on roll, pitch, and yaw commands determined by 
the on-board computer and presented to the crew on cockpit 
displays. The last two Gemini missions (11 and 12) flew the 
rolling entry mode automatically.  On Gemini 4 the crew flew 
manually based on procedures and cockpit instruments, but 
without the benefit of computer generated piloting cues due 
to a computer failure.  On other Gemini missions the crew 
flew manually using computer cues.
C. Apollo
The Apollo Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) 
system was designed to support entry from three types of 
trajectories.  These included entry from a near circular low 
Earth orbit (Apollo, Skylab, Apollo-Soyuz), Apollo highly 
elliptical Earth orbit aborts after Trans-Lunar Injection, and 
Apollo lunar return trajectories.  A skip entry capability was 
developed to enable the vehicle to reach an alternate landing 
site, in the event of weather concerns at the primary landing 
site.  A digital computer maintained estimates of translational 
and rotational states.  A three axis stable member IMU 
provided inertial measurements.  Like Gemini, IMU data was 
the only sensor data used to maintain the state vector during 
entry.  Guidance algorithms in the computer could be used 
either to automatically fly the vehicle or provide the crew 
with piloting cues for manual flying.  The limited on-board 
computer memory capacity had a great impact on software 
requirements, software architecture, and algorithm choices.  
Navigation data was used by entry guidance.  However, a 
skip entry was never flown on a crewed Apollo mission, in 
part due to limited navigation system accuracy.  
The crew could take over at any point in the event of a 
computer or an IMU failure. The Entry Monitoring System 
(EMS) provided manual piloting cues independent of the 
primary GNC system.  The EMS contained a single 
accelerometer.  EMS accelerometer data was used to compute 
a velocity estimate independent of the primary GNC system.  
Rate gyros in the Spacecraft Stabilization System provided 
backup attitude data to the crew.  In the event of both primary 
GNC and EMS failures, the crew flew a constant g bank-
reverse-bank trajectory using a secondary g meter and a roll 
attitude display.  If all sources of attitude reference data were 
lost, a rolling ballistic entry could be flown.  
All crewed Apollo missions automatically flew lifting 
entries to sites that did not require a skip.  There were no 
primary GNC failures.
III. SPACE SHUTTLE ENTRY NAVIGATION
A. The Shuttle Compared to Gemini and Apollo
For a spacecraft to fly from Mach 25, at orbital altitude to 
an unpowered runway landing, required a much more 
complex GNC system for entry and landing than previous 
vehicles.  Like Gemini and Apollo, the Shuttle controls 
down-range and cross-range error during entry by rolling the 
lift vector about the velocity vector.  Also, like Gemini and   
_
3Apollo, the shuttle uses RCS jets to control rotational motion.
Aero surfaces become active when there is sufficient 
dynamic pressure for them to be effective.  RCS jets are 
deactivated on a per axis basis when specified dynamic 
pressure levels are reached.  While Apollo was statically 
stable in pitch and yaw during entry, the Shuttle orbiter was 
designed to be statically unstable in pitch and yaw over most 
of the flight envelope.  This necessitates the use of computer 
algorithms for flight control for both automated and semi-
automatic human-in-the-loop flight.
The winged configuration of the Space Shuttle gave it an 
entry cross-range capability much greater than the Gemini 
and Apollo capsules.  The shuttle entry and landing trajectory 
is designed to prevent violations of vehicle constraints on the 
thermal protection system, structural loading, dynamic 
pressure, and aero surface hinge moments.  Furthermore, the 
vehicle must fly a trajectory that permits stable flight without
excessive expenditure of RCS and Auxiliary Power Unit 
propellant.  The entry and landing guidance algorithms must 
compute an accurate estimate of range to runway based on 
navigation data.  Navigation data of sufficient accuracy is 
required to ensure that the vehicle can adequately control the 
atmospheric drag and energy of the vehicle and remain within 
the previously mentioned constraints.  
B. Shuttle Navigation Flight Testing
The shuttle entry navigation system was exercised for the 
first time throughout the entire flight envelope on the first 
human flight (STS-1, April 1981). This was a different 
approach than the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo Programs.  
Entry GNC systems of those vehicles were tested on 
unmanned flights before the first manned mission. Some 
limited flight testing of shuttle entry navigation sensors was 
conducted before STS-1.  The Microwave Landing System, 
TACAN, and air data sensors were tested during the 
Approach and Landing Tests of the orbiter Enterprise at 
Edwards Air Force base in 1977.  TACAN tests were also 
conducted by a USAF SR-71 flying a profile similar to that of 
the shuttle.  
C. Shuttle Flight Computers
Redundant computers are used instead of the Gemini and 
Apollo single string computer architecture.  However, unlike 
Gemini and Apollo, the Shuttle requires the use of a computer 
to perform guidance, navigation and control functions during 
entry.  The shuttle had the first human rated Fail 
Operational/Fail Safe (FO/FS) avionics architecture to 
preserve mission options after the first failure.  This resulted
in a more complex and robust avionics system than Gemini 
and Apollo.  
For ascent and entry, five GNC computers are used.  A 
redundant set of four computers contain the Primary Avionics 
Software System (PASS).  The fifth runs Backup Flight 
Software (BFS).  The BFS, coded by a different contractor 
than the PASS, contains a subset of the PASS functionality to 
enable the vehicle to finish nominal ascent, an abort, or
_
landing in the event of a generic PASS software failure.  
Multiple navigation sensors, command paths, and power 
buses within the avionics system ensure redundancy.  
Unlike Gemini and Apollo, the manual pilot-in-the-loop 
mode of entry and landing requires a computer.  There are no 
back-up flight modes in the event that all four PASS and the 
single BFS computer fail.  Shuttle entry is flown automated 
with pilot-in-the-loop control as backup mode.  Just below 
Mach 1 pilot-in-the-loop control commences.  Automated 
flight is a back-up method for final approach and landing [7]. 
D. Shuttle Navigation Architecture
The shuttle entry navigation approach was significantly 
different than Gemini and Apollo.  Shuttle entry navigation 
required the use of other navigation aids in addition to IMUs
[2].  The accelerometer and gyro errors and biases from state-
of-the-art IMUs would not permit a safe entry and runway 
landing using IMU only navigation.
A state vector uplink is performed before the deorbit burn 
to both the PASS and BFS flight software.  This uplink is 
based on Mission Control processing of ground C Band radar 
(range and angles) and Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 
System (TDRSS) Doppler data.   
Entry navigation sensors are depicted in Fig. 1.  Redundant 
measurements from three High Accuracy Inertial Navigation 
System Inertial Measurement Units (HAINS IMUs), three 
TACANs, four barometric altimeters, and three Microwave 
Landing System (MLS) units are passed through Fault 
Detection, Identification, and Reconfiguration (FDIR)
_
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Fig. 1. Shuttle legacy entry navigation sensors.
4algorithms.  Selection filters then process data from units 
deemed to be good.  Selected measurements are then passed 
to the shuttle PASS and BFS navigation software, that 
processes the data using Kalman filters.  Radar altimeter data 
is used for pilot situational awareness only and is not 
incorporated into the shuttle navigation state. 
The first navigation filter measurement to be processed is 
drag altitude.  Accumulated sensed delta velocity data from 
the IMUs are processed to estimate atmospheric density and 
an estimate of altitude is obtained from an atmosphere model. 
Drag altitude measurements are inaccurate, but bound vertical 
position error growth in the event of other navigation system 
failures.
Kalman filter processing of selected TACAN range and 
bearing measurements begins at a range no greater than 400 
nautical miles from the runway and an altitude of roughly 
145,000 ft for a nominal entry and landing.  TACAN bearing 
is not processed when the elevation angle of the slant range is 
35 degrees or greater, a region known as the cone of 
confusion.  Radar tracking is normally established in time for 
Mission Control to assess the TACAN units and navigation 
state vector health before TACAN measurement processing 
commences in the PASS and BFS computers.  Measurements 
from two radars are required to ensure a good ground tracking 
solution.
Before the loss of Columbia ground radar tacking during 
entry was highly desirable and required if there were 
hardware failures on the vehicle.  Following the loss of the 
shuttle Columbia, ground radar tracking during entry and 
landing is mandatory for the remainder of the flight program.
Significant navigation errors during entry can exceed the 
ability of the guidance and flight control system to fly the 
orbiter to the landing site. Guidance constraints define the 
maximum allowable state error.  If radar tracking indicates 
that navigation errors are excessive, Mission Control can 
perform an emergency state vector correction uplink to the 
orbiter, called a delta state update.  In the event of a 
navigation error that exceeds the constraints, the delta state 
update is uplinked directly to the PASS flight software or 
voiced to the crew for manual entry on a cockpit display.  The 
BFS navigation state is then corrected by transferring the 
PASS state to the BFS. A delta state update has never been 
executed in flight, but is frequently practiced in training 
simulations by Mission Control personnel.
Drag altitude processing ends once barometric altimeter 
processing begins.  Two air data probes each provide two 
independent measurements.  Kalman filter processing of air 
data begins at Mach 2.5 and an altitude of about 85,000 ft.  
Barometric altimeter processing is inhibited between Mach 
1.6 and Mach 1.1, during the Mach jump region.
PASS Kalman filter processing of MLS range, azimuth and 
elevation data usually begins at an altitude of around 17,000 
ft.  Once MLS is acquired, PASS stops processing TACAN 
and barometric altimeter data and shifts from maintaining 
three state vectors to one.  For a landing site not equipped
_
with MLS, PASS processing of TACAN stops at an altitude 
of 1,500 ft and barometric altimeter processing continues 
until 500 ft.  BFS does not process MLS, but will process 
TACAN and baro data all the way to landing.
IV. SPACE SHUTTLE GPS UPGRADE
A. TACAN Phase-out and Receiver Selection
By the early 1990s, the approaching operational status of 
the GPS satellite constellation and advances in GPS receiver 
technology led to planning for deactivation of legacy 
radionavgiation aids.  While Space Shuttle entry navigation 
performance has been excellent since the first shuttle mission 
in 1981, the eventual phase-out of TACAN in favor of GPS 
required a change to the shuttle navigation system.  
The planned year 2000 start of TACAN phase-out 
motivated the Shuttle Program to select a GPS receiver that 
could be certified and flight proven by that year.   In 1993, the 
five channel Miniaturized Airborne GPS Receiver (MAGR) 
was chosen for TACAN replacement.  Existing space GPS 
receivers were not suitable for the shuttle from a weight and 
form factor perspective.  The MAGR would enable the 
Shuttle Program to take advantage of the existing logistics 
base supporting high volume military production.  The 
MAGR could accept inertial aiding, was capable of 
authorized operation, and the digital tracking loops could be 
modified with software changes, as opposed to hardware 
modifications.  In addition, military Class B parts 
requirements were similar to those of the Shuttle Program.  
While an all-in-view receiver would have been preferable, 
aviation receivers with the above characteristics were not 
available until at least 1998.  The MAGR version for the 
Shuttle is known as the MAGR/Shuttle or MAGR/S.
B. GPS Integration Architecture
GPS was integrated into the shuttle avionics system as a 
separate navigation system [1]. Periodic replacement of the 
shuttle navigation state vector with a selected GPS state 
vector avoided filtering GPS measurements or a position 
vector.  There was a strong desire to avoid modification and 
re-certification of the flight proven entry navigation 
algorithms and Kalman filters in the PASS and BFS software.  
The state replacement architecture also permitted flying the 
GPS receiver in a test mode, without committing to use GPS 
for navigation.  This was invaluable for testing the GPS 
receiver and associated shuttle flight software performance 
through the shuttle flight profile, from pre-launch on the pad 
to landing.
This integration architecture allows operation of a mixed 
fleet of GPS and TACAN hardware configurations with the 
same version of PASS and BFS flight software.  Due to the 
schedule of Orbiter Major Modification activities, not all 
orbiters were equipped with the same number of GPS 
receivers at the same time.  Configurations supported by the 
same version of shuttle flight software are:
5• Three TACANs and one GPS receiver (the single string 
configuration of Discovery and Atlantis).
• Three GPS units and no TACANs (the three string 
configuration of Endeavour). 
• Three TACANs and no GPS (none of the orbiters now have 
this configuration).
GPS vectors undergo a quality assurance and selection 
process before a GPS update to the navigation state can be 
performed.  PASS flight software subjects GPS state vectors 
to three Quality Assurance (QA) checks as follows:  
• Each GPS receiver Figure of Merit (FOM) is below a 
threshold.  
• Each current receiver state is compared with the previous 
receiver state propagated to the current time.  
• The current receiver states are compared with each other
(Endeavour only, not performed for single string).  
If criteria for any of the QA tests are violated, that 
receiver’s state is not a candidate for selection.  State vectors 
from candidate GPS units are then processed in a selection 
filter.  There are crew controls that allow these QA tests to be
bypassed, if necessary.  The BFS flight software uses a 
simpler QA and selection scheme than PASS does.  
Once the QA checks are complete and a GPS state has been 
selected, there are two crew commanded methods for 
incorporating the selected GPS state into navigation.  The first
involves automatic incorporation at a flight phase dependent 
rate, if the selected GPS state is within a tolerance of the 
current navigation state.  The selected GPS state vector 
overwrites the PASS or BFS navigation states.  The second 
method, called a “force,” ignores the comparison test with the 
current navigation state and incorporates (forces) the selected 
GPS state into navigation.  Selected MAGR/S states do not 
have to be continuously incorporated into shuttle navigation 
to support entry and landing. 
The GPS receivers are provided with position, velocity, and 
attitude aiding data from the shuttle flight software.  In the 
PASS computers, one aiding state vector is propagated for all 
three receivers, using selected IMU data from candidates that 
have been screened by a FDIR algorithm.  The single aiding 
state is periodically reset with the Shuttle navigation state.  
The MAGR/S uses two antennas (Fig. 2), that are located 
under the thermal protection system.  The single string 
configuration uses one on the top and one on the bottom of 
the crew compartment.  Input from the antennas is passed 
through pre-amplifiers and a signal combiner before reaching 
the MAGR/S.  Neither antenna switching nor attitude 
determination is performed.  In the three string GPS
_
configuration, antennas for GPS strings 1 and 3 occupy the 
former positions of the TACAN strings 1 and 3 antennas. 
C. GPS Flight Tests 
The initial flight test program supporting TACAN 
replacement used the 5 channel 3M receiver, a pre-production 
MAGR. The 3M flew seven times from December 1993 to 
May 1996 on Endeavor (flights 61, 59, 68, 67, 69, 72 and 77, 
in launch order).
This series of flight tests was intended to determine if a 
GPS receiver designed for aviation use could function on the 
Space Shuttle with a minimum number of software changes.  
Some modifications were made to the 3M software between 
flights based on flight test results.  Inertial Navigation System 
aiding data was supplied to the 3M by the BFS computer 
during ascent and entry, while on-orbit the receiver was 
unaided.  Modifications were made to the MAGR/S based on 
3M flight results.  
From September 1996 to June 2002 the MAGR/S flew 25 
times on the orbiters Columbia, Discovery, Atlantis, and 
Endeavour in support of the certification effort.  On many 
flights, a laptop computer was used to record instrumentation 
port data, in addition to receiver data normally transmitted to 
Mission Control during a mission. This data greatly enhanced 
vendor efforts to track down and resolve complex software 
issues in the GPS receiver.
Test activities included astronaut execution of MAGR/S 
procedures. Selected MAGR/S state vectors were 
incorporated into the PASS and BFS flight software on 
several occasions while on-orbit.  In December of 1999, 
before the deactivation of Selective Availability, the 
MAGR/S was intentionally unkeyed before entry and landing.  
Another test involved a late power-on of the receiver just 
before entry to verify the ability of it to quickly collect 
ephemerides and establish four satellite navigation.
The original flight of three string GPS (no TACANs) was 
planned for STS-96 in mid 1999. However, GPS certification 
was delayed for several reasons. First, the start date of 
TACAN decommissioning slid to the right (Fig. 3), lowering 
the priority of the GPS upgrade. Second, additional time was 
required to resolve GPS receiver and shuttle computer 
software issues encountered during flight and ground testing. 
Third, the legacy navigation system continued to exhibit 
excellent performance.
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6Additional receiver software versions, laboratory testing 
and Shuttle test flights were scheduled.  Project changes were 
made to enhance communication between project participants 
and to improve identification, documentation and resolution 
of issues. The NASA independent verification and validation 
contractor audited the receiver software, that had been 
developed at government expense [3-4].
D. Contingency Use of GPS before Certification
During the pre-certification flight test phase (1996 to 2002), 
flight rules were defined to govern the use of selected 
MAGR/S state vectors under emergency scenarios, even 
though the MAGR/S was not yet certified.  Those scenarios 
were:
• Use in place of a voice delta state uplink. 
• Low cloud ceilings at landing, on-board and/or ground 
station TACAN and MLS failures that could result in a 
high-risk crew bailout and loss of vehicle.
• Resolution by Mission Control of dilemmas between 
redundant legacy navigation sensors.
E. Three String GPS Certification
The MAGR/S and associated shuttle computer software 
was certified for TACAN replacement in August of 2002, 
over three years after the original target date.  On October 23,
2003, the Shuttle Program approved the removal of the three 
TACAN units from Endeavour, and the installation of two 
additional MAGR/S receivers. This brought Endeavour to the 
three string GPS configuration.
F. Certification of Simultaneous Processing of Single String 
GPS and TACAN
After three string certification, it was expected that the 
Program would continue to fly a mixed fleet of single and 
three string GPS configured orbiters for some time.  The 
upgrade from single to three string GPS would occur as each 
orbiter was cycled through the periodic Orbiter Major 
Modification activity.
In addition to activities to certify three string GPS, work 
was also performed to certify single string GPS use during 
entry simultaneous with TACAN.  Testing was performed to 
prove that the legacy navigation system could recover from a  
GPS outage or an update by a worst case GPS vector that 
made it through the quality assurance tests and selection filter.  
Testing also confirmed that GPS state vector processing in the 
PASS and BFS computers would not interfere with 
measurements processing from legacy navigation sensors.  
Monte Carlo runs were executed in a simulation of the shuttle 
flight software.  Testing was also conducted in the Shuttle 
Avionics Integration Laboratory at the NASA Johnson Space 
Center, using real shuttle hardware and software. 
Test results indicated that there were no ill effects from 
simultaneous TACAN and GPS processing and that GPS 
incorporation improved navigation system performance until 
MLS acquisition.  PASS navigation state updates at MLS 
acquisition were smaller and required trajectory corrections 
by the crew were reduced during the final approach phase.
Use of single string GPS data in conjunction with TACAN 
was certified for flight in December of 2002.
G. Additional Uses of Single String GPS
After the three and single string GPS configurations were 
certified for operational use, additional uses for single string
GPS pertaining to launch commit and entry were determined.  
These further enhanced safety of flight and provided the crew 
and Mission Control personnel with operational experience 
and confidence building in GPS before the program replaced 
TACAN.  These additional uses were:  
• Use GPS as an extra level of redundancy in case of on-
board TACAN failure, TACAN ground station failure, 
or C Band radar failure. 
• Provide redundancy in the event of ground radar tracking 
station failures. 
• Avoid early mission termination due to TACAN failures 
while on-orbit.
• Provide state vectors to support emergency deorbit if 
vectors from Mission Control are not available.
• Permit launch in the event of a TACAN failure on the pad. 
Emergency shuttle landings could be performed at sites 
other than the Kennedy Space Center, Edwards Air Force 
Base, and Northrup Strip.  These landings could force the 
shuttle to use TACAN ground stations that are not calibrated 
to tighter NASA standards.  TACAN biases resulting from 
use of less stringently calibrated ground stations can result in
navigation errors that violate the guidance constraints.  
TACAN accuracy depends on the orbiter trajectory with 
respect to the TACAN ground station, the type of approach
_
Fig. 3. Timeline of GPS Project events and TACAN phase-out start dates 
from the Federal Radionavigation Plan.
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7flown (overhead or straight in), the distance of the TACAN 
ground station from the runway, and the duration of the cone 
of confusion.  Single string GPS provides more accurate and 
reliable navigation for such landings.
However, a lack of GPS redundancy in the single string 
configuration prevents the GPS receiver from being used as a 
sole means of navigation for emergency landings.
H. GPS and the Columbia Accident
Columbia carried a GPS receiver on its final flight, STS-
107 (January-February 2003).  The receiver was recovered on 
Friday morning, February 28 (a month after the loss of the 
vehicle and crew), about 300 yards west of Toledo Bend 
Reservoir, in eastern Texas.  The unit was in relatively good 
condition and the receiver vendor extracted data from it.  This 
data was supplied to the Columbia investigation team.  GPS 
receiver data from the Columbia entry was used along with 
other on-board navigation data to reconstruct the entry 
trajectory and event timeline.
After the loss of Columbia, the Shuttle Program was 
directed to end flights in 2010.  As a result, the Program 
decided not to upgrade the orbiters Discovery and Atlantis
from the single string GPS to the three string GPS 
configuration.  Unlike Endeavour, these orbiters will process 
GPS single string in parallel with TACAN.
V. SHUTTLE SINGLE STRING GPS RAMP-UP
A. Ramp-Up Philosophy
The original circa 1998 plan for introducing GPS 
navigation to Space Shuttle entry assumed that GPS would be 
used for the first time on the first all GPS, no TACAN flight.  
First use of GPS navigation for entry depended only upon the 
certification of the GPS system on the shuttle. However, when 
the GPS certification effort was extended and modification of 
the first vehicle for three string operations was delayed, the  
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ULF1.1
STS-115
12A
STS-116
12A.1
STS-117
13A
STS-118
13A.1
Orbiter
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OV-103
Atlantis
OV-104
Endeavour
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Launch/
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39A
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7/17/06
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9/21/06
KSC 33
12/22/06
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6/22/07
EDW 22
8/21/07
KSC 15
Navigation 
Configuration
1 GPS 
3 TACANS
1 GPS 
3 TACANS
1 GPS 
3 TACANS
1 GPS 
3 TACANS
3 GPS
Pre-Deorbit
PASS
GPS
GPS
GPS
GPS
BFS
GPS
Entry*
PASS †‡
TACAN
GPS
TACAN
GPS
TACAN
GPS
TACAN
GPS
BFS †
GPS
TACAN
TACAN
TACAN
GPS
TACAN
PASS → BFS
state vector
transfers
* GPS is incorporated during entry after confirmation with ground radar.
† PASS and BFS also incorporate drag altitude and barometric altimeter measurements.
‡ PASS incorporates GPS until MLS acquisition.  If MLS is not available, GPS incorporation stops at 500 ft.
TABLE I
GPS RAMP-UP FLIGHTS
operations community elected to implement a ramp-up 
philosophy in order to gain confidence in and operational 
experience with the use of GPS during entry. This ramp-up 
approach involved the phased application of GPS to either 
PASS or BFS, in parallel with TACAN processing.
B. GPS Incorporation During the Single String Ramp-Up
The operational single string ramp-up for GPS use during 
entry occurred over four flights in 2006 and 2007 (Table I) to 
the International Space Station. These flights were flown by 
the orbiters Discovery and Atlantis. 
GPS incorporation was limited to the BFS for the first flight 
(STS-121) to keep the PASS navigation software in a nominal 
state, untouched by GPS (Fig. 4).  In the event of a problem 
with GPS and BFS navigation, the PASS would not be 
impacted.  GPS incorporation began once confirmation of 
acceptable GPS performance was obtained with ground radar 
tracking.
The second (STS-115) and third (STS-116) flights 
incorporated GPS to the PASS only, leaving the BFS in a 
nominal state.  The fourth flight (STS-117) incorporated GPS 
in both the PASS and BFS.  On these flights GPS was 
incorporated before the deorbit burn, during the deorbit
preparation periods from approximately 2.5 hours through 45 
minutes before the deorbit burn. GPS was then inhibited until 
confirmation with ground tracking during entry. 
C. Single String Ramp-Up GPS Flight Performance
Before the deorbit burn periodic comparisons between the 
ground tracking solution, based on TDRSS and C-Band 
tracking data, confirmed good GPS states.  Radar tracking 
during entry also confirmed good GPS performance before 
GPS data was taken to the PASS and/or BFS.  
During all flights GPS performed as expected during entry 
and was in agreement with the ground radar tracking derived 
state vector.  PASS navigation, BFS navigation, and legacy 
8sensor  performance (TACAN, IMU, air data, MLS) was also 
as expected. 
Additional analysis of GPS and integrated navigation 
system performance was performed after each mission.  A 
Best Estimate of Trajectory (BET) was generated using both 
ground and onboard navigation sources, including ground 
tracking, IMU, and MLS data. The BET is used for evaluating 
the performance of PASS and BFS navigation. All the 
available data is processed using a forward pass Kalman filter 
and a backward smoother.  Quality Assurance test and 
receiver tracking performance was also examined.
D. STS-116 GPS Flight Results
The following is a discussion of flight results for the STS-
116 single string GPS flight.  The entry and landing of 
Discovery occurred on December 22, 2006 with a landing on 
Kennedy Space Center runway 15. The first deorbit
opportunity was waived off due to a weather concern.  
Before the deorbit burn GPS was processed in the PASS for 
just over 155 minutes. The one revolution delay in performing 
the deorbit burn resulted in a longer period of pre-deorbit
burn GPS processing than was performed on STS-115. 
Periodic comparisons between the ground tracking solution, 
based on TDRSS and C-Band tracking data, confirmed good 
GPS states during this timeframe.  Deorbit occurred on the 
second opportunity resulting in an approach to KSC 15 from 
the westerly direction (Fig. 5 and 6).  
Receiver performance during entry is illustrated by three 
receiver parameters plotted in Fig. 7.  Figure of Merit (FOM) 
is the GPS receiver estimate of the accuracy of the GPS 
position vector.  Geometric Dilution of Precision (GDOP) is a 
measure of how well the geometry of the tracked GPS 
satellites will enable the receiver to resolve position errors. 
Normally the receiver tracks 4 satellites for navigation 
measurements.  The less that 4 satellite tracking flag (bottom 
plot in Fig. 7) is set to a value of one if less than 4 satellites 
are tracked.
During the entry plasma region, the number of satellites 
available to track is reduced due to the ionizing effects of the
plasma. This results in higher FOM and GDOP values, called 
chimneys.  The number of satellites tracked will vary from 
four to zero.  During the plasma region, which ranged from an 
altitude of 271,000 ft to 225,000 ft, a FOM chimney (FOM > 
5) was experienced with a duration much longer than those 
typically observed on previous shuttle missions (Fig. 7). 
The FOM chimney caused the GPS state vector to fail a QA 
test, therefore it was not a candidate for incorporation into the 
PASS navigation software.  The chimney duration was 13 
minutes and 10 seconds and ended at an altitude of 173,000 
ft. Analysis indicated that two factors contributed to the 
chimney, neither of which was due to plasma. The line-of-
sight vectors to two of the satellites were very close, resulting 
in poor satellite geometry. One of the satellites had been 
recently activated and not yet moved to its final orbital 
location. Additionally, there were repeated unsuccessful 
attempts to acquire a satellite that was blocked by the shuttle 
wing. FOM chimneys are not normally seen this late in the 
entry.  However, the chimney ended and a GPS state vector 
was again available for selection before a PASS navigation 
state update was required to ensure adequate vehicle 
performance.
Navigation state vector accuracy during entry is illustrated 
on plots comparing the PASS and BFS position vectors to the 
post-flight BET (Fig. 8 to Fig. 10). State vector differences 
between the vectors are in an Earth-relative frame, centered 
on the spacecraft, and expressed in the radial (U), in-track 
(V), and  cross-track (W) directions. 
TACAN data was incorporated in the PASS at an altitude 
of 147,000 ft. TACAN processing decreased the downtrack
position error in the navigation state to low values, as 
expected (Fig. 8).  A residual error was left in the radial and 
crosstrack directions. During the initial processing timeframe, 
TACAN is not as effective in the radial and crosstrack
directions. 
GPS was incorporated in the PASS at an altitude of 137,000 
ft (Fig. 8). At the time of GPS incorporation, the remaining 
4,000 ft of radial and 2,000 ft of crosstrack error in the 
navigation state was corrected. Fig. 9 shows the BET and 
PASS comparisons from 130,000 ft to touchdown; the saw-
tooth pattern indicating the update of the navigation state with
GPS is apparent.  There were no QA test failures during GPS 
incorporation.
Fig. 4. GPS incorporation for the single string GPS ramp-up flights.
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9Fig. 10. STS-116 BET versus BFS position vector compare.
Fig. 9. STS-116 BET versus PASS position vector compare.
Fig. 8. STS-116 BET versus PASS position vector compare.
Fig. 7. STS-116 receiver performance parameters.
Fig. 5. STS-116 entry ground track.
Fig. 6. STS-116 approach and landing ground track.
4. TAKE AIR DATA 
Time to Go  = 6:30
Altitude = 81,000 ft
Mach = 2.5
Range = 43.7 nm 
5. TAEM 
Time to Go  = 6:28
Altitude = 80,400 ft
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Range = 42.9 nm
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Range = 210 nm 
2. RADAR CONFIRM
Time to Go  = 10:36
Altitude = 142,000 ft
Mach = 8.1
Range = 262 nm 
3. TAKE GPS 
Time to Go  = 10:14
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Range = 9.2 nm 
10
distribution analysis, data was examined on STS-118 during 
the orbit phase to determine if the actual receiver #1 and #3 
performance matched the predicted performance from the 
ADL.  Data was gathered during a 21.5 hour time period 
following undocking from the International Space Station.  
The receiver #1 upper antenna pre-amp and the receiver #3 
lower antenna pre-amp were powered off.  This enabled GPS 
personnel to determine the gain patterns for the receiver #1 
lower antenna and the receiver #3 upper antenna. Since the 
receiver #1 and receiver #3 antenna configurations are 
symmetrical, the antenna gain patterns for all four antennas 
associated with receivers #1 and #3 could be determined. The 
data indicated that the antennas performed as expected and in 
most cases better than expected.  This confirmed the validity 
of the receiver #1 and #3 antenna patterns used in ADL 
testing for GPS certification. 
The performance of the QA tests and GPS state vector 
selection was also examined during the on-orbit phase of the 
flight.  Performance was as expected.
C. Entry Navigation Performance
The entry of Endeavour occurred on August 21, 2007 with 
a landing at Kennedy Space Center on runway 15. 
GPS was processed before the deorbit burn for just over 79 
minutes. Periodic comparisons between the ground tracking 
solution, based on TDRSS and C-Band tracking data, 
confirmed good GPS states during this timeframe.  The 
deorbit occurred on the first opportunity resulting in an 
approach to KSC from the southerly direction (Fig. 11, 12).  
GPS tracking performance did degrade during the plasma 
region, as expected.  Plasma effects were observed from 
approximately 268,000 ft to approximately 210,000 ft.  There 
were failures of the receiver to receiver state vector compare 
QA test during this period, but these failures did not impact 
navigation performance or subsequent use of GPS data.  
Plasma effects disappeared and receiver tracking 
performance returned to nominal well before GPS was 
processed in the PASS.  
GPS processing in the PASS began at an altitude of 
138,600 ft. after confirmation with ground radar tracking.   
Fig. 13 and 14 show the BET and PASS comparisons, from 
400,000 ft to touchdown and 130,000 ft to touchdown, 
respectively. As can be seen from the plots, the PASS 
compared very well to the BET following the incorporation 
of GPS. The saw-tooth pattern indicates the update of the 
PASS state with a GPS selected state.  There were no QA test 
failures during GPS incorporation.
MLS processing began at an altitude of 22,000 ft. MLS 
processing had little impact on the PASS navigation state due 
to the previous incorporation of GPS. As compared to the 
post-flight BET, PASS navigation position errors before MLS 
incorporation were -36 ft radial, -104 ft down-track, and 66 ft 
in cross-track.  PASS position errors after one cycle of MLS 
data had been incorporated were -1 ft radial, -103 ft down-
track, and 56 ft in cross-track.
Fig. 10 is a comparison of the BFS navigation state with the 
BET from 400,000 ft to landing.  BFS incorporated legacy 
navigation data (IMU, TACAN, air data) but no GPS data.
VI. STS-118 FLIGHT RESULTS
A. GPS Navigation Objective
The STS-118 mission of Endeavour was the 34th flight of 
the MAGR/S on the Shuttle fleet and was the first flight with 
three GPS receivers and no TACANs. The ramp-up objective
for STS-118 was to incorporate three string GPS into the 
PASS and to maintain the BFS navigation state accuracy 
within acceptable limits with periodic state vector transfers 
from the PASS.
B. Orbit GPS Performance Evaluation before Entry
Single string missions used the antenna locations for GPS 
receiver number 2 on the top and bottom of the crew cabin 
(Fig. 2).   However, the GPS antennas for receivers #1 and #3 
on Endeavour are in the former TACAN antenna locations.  
STS-118 was the first flight that would provide GPS 
performance data for GPS antennas located in the legacy 
TACAN antenna locations.  
The standard configuration for the three string GPS 
receivers during the orbit phase of a mission is only one 
receiver powered on.  This configuration lowers the power 
requirement while still providing GPS state vectors from a 
single receiver. However, since STS-118 was the first three-
string flight, the receivers remained powered for the entire 
flight in order to observe the following:
• The FOM distribution for receivers #1 and #3.
• The antenna gain pattern for receivers #1 and #3.
• The GPS state vector quality assurance tests and vector   
selection with three receivers.
The FOM distribution analysis was intended to determine if 
the FOM performance for receivers #1 and #3 would be 
similar to that of receiver #2. GPS hardware-in-the-loop 
certification simulations performed in the Avionics 
Development Lab (ADL) indicated that performance of 
receivers #1 and #3 would be slightly worse than receiver #2.  
Data from all three receivers were recorded from GPS power 
up before launch through docking with the ISS and from 
undocking through GPS power-down after landing. The 
performance of all three receivers was determined to meet 
entry navigation accuracy requirements.
On-orbit GPS data from a single string GPS flight was used 
to determine the gain patterns for the receiver #2 upper and 
lower antennas.  Receiver #1 and #3 upper and lower antenna 
gain patterns were extrapolated from the receiver #2 patterns.  
The gain patterns were used in the ADL simulations 
performed during the certification effort.  As with the FOM    
_
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Fig. 15. STS-118 BET versus BFS position vector compare.
Fig. 14. STS-118 BET versus PASS position vector compare.
Fig. 16. STS-118 receiver 1 performance parameters.
Fig. 11. STS-118 entry ground track.
Fig. 12. STS-118 approach and landing ground track.
Fig. 13. STS-118 BET versus PASS position vector compare.
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1. TAEM 
Time to Go  = 6:27
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4. MAIN GEAR 
TOUCHDOWN
1. RADAR CONFIRM
Time to Go  = 10:56
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5. MAIN GEAR 
TOUCHDOWN 
4. TAEM 
Time to Go  = 6:27
Altitude = 81,800 ft
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Range = 38.5 nm 
3. TAKE AIR DATA 
Time to Go  = 6:50
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2. TAKE GPS 
Time to Go  = 10:47
Altitude = 137,000 ft
Mach = 7.9
Range = 245 nm  
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Fig. 17. STS-118 receiver 2 performance parameters.
Fig. 18. STS-118 receiver 3 performance parameters.
Air data measurements resulted in larger updates to the BFS 
state vector than are typically seen.  This was due to not 
incorporating TACAN or GPS directly in the BFS navigation 
state.  Per the ramp-up plan, the BFS state was managed with 
periodic state vector transfers from the PASS to the BFS. It 
was expected that one or two state vectors transfers would be 
required during entry to maintain acceptable BFS navigation 
state accuracy. During the STS-118 entry, only a single 
transfer at an altitude of 62,600 ft was performed. Fig. 15 
shows the BET and BFS comparisons and clearly shows the 
transfer at 62,600 ft.  Since neither GPS nor TACAN data    
was incorporated in the BFS, the BFS state began to degrade 
soon after the state vector transfer from the PASS.  However, 
the accuracy of BFS state following the transfer remained 
within the required limits and a second transfer was not 
required. 
Receiver performance is in Fig. 16, 17, and 18.  Each 
receiver uses a different pair of antennas with different 
boresights (Fig. 2).  FOM, GDOP, and number of satellites 
tracked by all three receivers varied during entry. State 
vectors from all three GPS receivers were generally within 
100 ft of the ground radar tracking solution in the radial, 
down-track, and cross-track directions.
VII. STATE VECTOR MANAGEMENT ON FUTURE 
SHUTTLE FLIGHTS
STS-123 is the next scheduled flight for Endeavour and will 
be the second three-string GPS flight. The PASS and BFS 
navigation states for STS-123 will be managed in the same
manner as on STS-118.  GPS updates will be incorporated 
into the PASS and state vector transfers from the PASS to the 
BFS will maintain an acceptable level of BFS navigation 
accuracy. The current operational plan for the third flight of 
three-string GPS, currently manifested for STS-126, is for 
GPS to be taken to both the PASS and BFS.  This will 
eliminate the need for state vector transfers from the PASS to 
BFS (Fig. 19). 
Nominal GPS procedures following ramp-up, for both 
single string and three string flights, will entail processing 
GPS in both the PASS and BFS from confirmation with 
ground tracking through landing. GPS will also be processed 
on-orbit before the deorbit burn. The legacy navigation aids, 
drag altitude, TACAN (for single string flights), air data, and 
MLS will continue to be processed during the entry and 
landing phases.
Fig. 19. GPS and TACAN incorporation after the ramp-up flights.
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XII. SUMMARY
The Space Shuttle Program has successfully integrated, 
flight proven, and certified GPS navigation into the Space 
Shuttle avionics system as a TACAN replacement.  The 
integration architecture permitted flight testing of the GPS 
receiver and associated shuttle flight computer software 
without requiring the use of GPS for entry navigation.  In 
addition, the GPS integration was performed in a manner that 
did not compromise the integrity of the legacy entry 
navigation system.
Due to the impending retirement of the Shuttle fleet in 
2010, only the orbiter Endeavour is equipped with three GPS 
receivers and no TACANs.  Discovery and Atlantis will 
continue to use three TACAN units in conjunction with one 
GPS receiver.  Single string GPS provides the Space Shuttle 
with several benefits.  These benefits are:
• An extra level of redundancy in the event of a TACAN 
failure.
• Additional redundancy in the event of a ground radar failure 
during entry. 
• Avoiding early mission termination due to TACAN failures  
while on-orbit. 
• More accurate and reliable navigation for landings at sites 
with no ground radar or sites that have TACAN ground 
stations of questionable calibration. 
• A source of state vectors to support autonomous emergency 
deorbit and landing.
Many important technical and process lessons were learned 
during the extended flight test program.  These lessons are 
being applied to navigation development for the next NASA 
human spacecraft, Orion. 
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Agenda
Entry Navigation for Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo
Shuttle Entry Navigation
Requirement for Shuttle GPS
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Shuttle GPS Flight Tests
Ramp-Up for Using GPS During Entry
Ramp-Up Flight Results
Lessons Learned
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IMU Only Entry Nav For Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo
Mercury – Ballistic entry
Directional and vertical gyros
0.05 g accelerometer switch
Gemini – Lifting or Ballistic entry
Flight computer
Stable member IMU
Backup Rate Gyros
Apollo – Lifting entry
Flight computer 
Stable member IMU
Backup rate gyros
Backup accelerometer
G meter
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Shuttle Required a More Complex Entry Nav System
Unpowered runway landings.
Larger cross-range capability.
Tighter thermal, aero, and
structural constraints.
Statically unstable in pitch
and yaw.
Use of aero-surfaces along 
with RCS jets.
Four primary flight computers.
One backup flight computer.
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Shuttle entry nav requires more sensors than IMUs.
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By 1993, TACAN phase-out was scheduled to begin
in the year 2000.
In 1993 the Shuttle Program
selected an in-production 
military aviation receiver.
Shuttle GPS was scheduled to 
be certified in early 1999.
First flight with three GPS 
receivers and no TACAN units 
was scheduled for mid-1999.
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What does the Space Shuttle use GPS for?
TACAN replacement during entry.
GPS is available on-orbit if it is needed.
GPS does not perform precision orbit determination.
GPS is not used for rendezvous
GPS is not used for precision landing.
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Why does the Space Shuttle have a 5 channel
GPS receiver?
In 1993 all-in-view military aviation receivers were 
not available.
They did become available in 1998, two years
before TACAN phase-out was scheduled to begin.
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Will the Space Shuttle be upgraded with an 
all-in-view GPS receiver?
No.  The Shuttle Program will stop flying in 2010.
Current navigation system performance with a 5 channel 
receiver is acceptable.
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GPS was integrated as a 
separate navigation system to 
avoid changes to the flight 
proven legacy system.
Shuttle GPS could be tested over 
an entire Shuttle mission without
having to use GPS data for 
navigation.
Shuttle entry nav performance has been excellent
since the first flight in 1981. 
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Between September 1996 and June 2002 there
were 25 Shuttle missions that flew GPS in support 
of certification. 
Extensive flight testing
allowed complex software
issues to be discovered 
and resolved.
GPS was certified for use 
during missions in August 
of 2002. 
The first all GPS, no 
TACAN flight was flown 
in August of 2007.
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Why did it take so long?
1. The planned date for the start of TACAN phase-out in the
Federal Radionavigation Plan slid to the right and is now TBD.
2. Continued TACAN availability and the excellent performance 
of the legacy navigation system made GPS a lower priority.
3. In 1998 the Shuttle Program decided to delay certification
and perform additional flight and ground testing.
4. Loss of Columbia.
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Each Orbiter is equipped with GPS.
Atlantis and Discovery have 
one GPS receiver.  GPS is 
processed in parallel
with TACAN, IMU, drag 
altimeter, and air data.
Endeavour has three GPS 
units and no TACANs.  
GPS is processed in parallel
with IMU, drag altimeter, 
and air data.
GPS is not processed once
MLS is available.
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In 2006 and 2007 Atlantis and Discovery
processed GPS during entry to build confidence 
before the first no TACAN flight by Endeavour.
GPS processed before the deorbit burn and during 
entry after confirmation of performance with ground 
radar tracking.
TACAN still processed.
STS-121 – GPS to backup computer.
STS-115 – GPS to primary computers.
STS-116 – GPS to primary computers.
STS-117 – GPS to primary and backup computers.
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1. TAKE TACAN
Time to Go  = 10:58
Altitude = 147,000 ft
Mach = 7
Range = 210 nm 
2. RADAR CONFIRM
Time to Go  = 10:36
Altitude = 142,000 ft
Mach = 8.1
Range = 262 nm
3. TAKE GPS
Time to Go  = 10:14
Altitude = 137,000 ft
Mach = 7.5
Range = 237 nm 
4. TAKE AIR DATA
Time to Go  = 6:30
Altitude = 81,000 ft
Mach = 2.5
Range = 43.7 nm 
5. MLS PROCESSING
Time to Go  = 1:55
Altitude = 16,000 ft
Mach = 0.6
Range = 9.8 nm
6. MAIN GEAR 
TOUCHDOWN 
STS-116 Navigation Events (Dec. 2006)
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STS-116 Best Estimate of Trajectory Position 
Compare With Primary Computer Navigation 
DRAG
TACAN
GPS
GPS
TACAN
DRAG
DRAG
GPS
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STS-118 Flight of Endeavour
GPS updates to the primary 
computers before the deorbit
burn and during entry after 
confirmation of performance 
with ground radar tracking.
Primary computer took GPS 
updates in parallel with IMU, 
drag altimeter, and air data.  
GPS not processed once 
MLS was available.
State vector transfers from 
the primary computers to the 
backup computer due to lack 
of TACAN.
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5. MAIN GEAR 
TOUCHDOWN
4. MLS PROCESSING
Time to Go  = 2:24
Altitude = 22,000 ft
Mach = 0.7
Range = 10.7 nm 
3. TAKE AIR DATA
Time to Go  = 6:50
Altitude = 81,000 ft
Mach = 2.4
Range = 37.6 nm
2. TAKE GPS
Time to Go  = 10:47
Altitude = 137,000 ft
Mach = 7.9
Range = 245 nm 
1. RADAR CONFIRM
Time to Go  = 10:56
Altitude = 142,000 ft
Mach = 8
Range = 255 nm 
STS-118 Navigation Events (Aug. 2007)
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GPS
GPS
GPS
DRAG
DRAG
STS-118 Best Estimate of Trajectory Position 
Compare With Primary Computer Navigation 
GPS
GPS
GPS
DRAG
DRAG
DRAG
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Shuttle nav versus Best Estimate of Trajectory
shows MLS provided little accuracy improvement
due to GPS.
MLS processing began and GPS stopped at 22,000 feet.
Radial
Down-track
Cross-track
Before MLS
-36 feet
-104 feet
66 feet
After MLS
-1 feet
-103 feet
56 feet
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NASA GPS Lessons Learned Documents
GPS Lessons Learned From the 
ISS, Space Shuttle and X-38
Lessons Learned From Seven 
Space Shuttle Missions
Three Years of Global Positioning 
System Experience on 
International Space Station
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GPS lessons learned are being applied
to development of the Orion spacecraft.
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Summary
GPS is a TACAN replacement 
on Endeavour.
Discovery and Atlantis have
GPS and TACAN.
Integration architecture
permitted test flights without 
having to use GPS.
Ramp-up flights using GPS 
and TACAN in parallel built
confidence before first TACAN 
replacement flight.
GPS performance is excellent.
Page 25
Questions
